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Notes
RELIGIOUS PROPERTY DISPUTES AND INTRINSICALLY
RELIGIOUS EVIDENCE: TOWARDS A NARROW
APPLICATION OF THE NEUTRAL
PRINCIPLES APPROACH
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1970's, doctrinal changes within the Episcopal
Church have resulted in numerous instances of local congregations vot-
ing to withdraw their affiliation from the Episcopal Church.' These
withdrawals, in many instances, have evolved into a dispute over the
possession of church property between a secessionist majority of a local
parish on the one hand and a minority loyal to the Episcopal Church on
the other.2 Not surprisingly, churches of many denominations have be-
come involved in church property disputes.3 Among these, cases involv-
1. See, e.g., Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599,
171 Cal. Rptr. 541 (doctrinal controversy involving ordination of women as
priests and interpretation of Nicene Creed), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981);
Bishop & Diocese v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85 (Colo.) (doctrinal changes concerning
ordination of women, divorce and changes in Book of Common Prayer), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 826 (1986); Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 759
S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1988) (disagreement with national church policy); Bennison v.
Sharp, 121 Mich. App. 705, 329 N.W.2d 466 (1982) (canon amendments insti-
tuting various doctrinal changes within church); Tea v. Protestant Episcopal
Church, 96 Nev. 399, 610 P.2d 182 (1980) (majority of voting parishioners
passed resolution to secede from national church); Protestant Episcopal Church
v. Graves, 83 N.J. 572, 417 A.2d 19 (1980) (doctrinal dispute concerning ordina-
tion of women and changes in Book of Common Prayer), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1131 (1981). See generally Ross, The Need for an Exclusive and Uniform Application of
"Neutral Principles" in the Adjudication of Church Property Disputes, 32 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 263, 292 (1987); Sirico, Church Property Disputes: Churches as Secular and
Alien Institutions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 335, 342-43 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541; Mote, 716 P.2d
85. For a discussion of other classes of religious disputes frequently presented
to civil courts for resolution, see Young & Tigges, Into the Religious Thicket- Con-
stitutional Limits on Civil Court Jurisdiction over Ecclesiastical Disputes, 47 OHIO ST. L.J.
475 (1986).
3. See, e.g., African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in America, Inc. v.
Zion Hill Methodist Church, Inc., 534 So. 2d 224 (Ala. 1988); Barker, 115 Cal.
App. 3d 599, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541; Samoan Congregational Christian Church in
the United States v. Samoan Congregational Christian Church of Oceanside, 66
Cal. App. 3d 69, 135 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1977); United Pentecostal Church of Louis-
ville v. Morrison, 527 P.2d 1169 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Mills v. Baldwin, 362 So.
2d 2 (Fla. 1978) (Presbyterian Church in the United States), vacated, 443 U.S.
914 (1979), on remand, 377 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983
(1980); Hinkle Creek Friends Church v. Western Yearly Meeting of Friends
Church, 469 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (Quaker); Russian Church of Our
(949)
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ing the Episcopal Church afford a telling example of the nuances and
pitfalls inherent in the task of applying notions of civil law to religious
property disputes.4
The Constitution requires that judicial resolution of church prop-
erty disputes turn on secular considerations while still respecting reli-
gious autonomy.5 Specifically, the first amendment 6 severely restricts
the scope of the inquiry that civil courts may undertake in resolving dis-
putes over religious property. 7 The Supreme Court has articulated two
constitutionally permissible methods for analyzing church property dis-
putes. 8 Each method, in its own way, seeks to free civil courts from any
Lady of Kazan v. Dunkel, 33 N.Y.2d 456, 310 N.E.2d 307, 354 N.Y.S.2d 631
(1974) (Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church of America); Park Slope Jew-
ish Center v. Stern, 128 Misc. 2d 909, 491 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (Ortho-
dox Judaism), rev'd on other grounds, 128 A.D.2d 847, 513 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1987);
Southside Tabernacle v. Pentecostal Church of God, 32 Wash. App. 814, 650
P.2d 231 (1982).
4. For a listing of cases involving the Episcopal Church, see supra note 1.
This Note attempts to challenge some of the prevailing factual assumptions
upon which civil courts have relied in applying constitutional principles to prop-
erty disputes involving the Protestant Episcopal Church. In so doing, it is hoped
that this Note can provide a legitimate and valid foundation for the sound appli-
cation of constitutional doctrine to religious property disputes. This Note
makes a more searching inquiry into the history and organization of the Protes-
tant Episcopal Church than that traditionally undertaken in civil court opinions
in an effort to provide both guidance in the context of the Episcopal Church as
well as to suggest the level of inquiry necessary and appropriate to fairly decide
disputes in this, as well as other, denominational contexts.
5. See Sirico, The Constitutional Dimensions of Church Property Disputes, 59 WASH.
U.L.Q 1, 48 (1981).
6. The first amendment states in pertinent part that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. First amendment protection applies to the states through the operation
of the fourteenth amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304
(1940) (states may regulate time, place and manner of certain religious activities,
but cannot do so on basis of what is taught, preached or distributed). The first
amendment prohibits civil courts from inquiring into and deciding issues of reli-
gious doctrine and practice. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of
God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970); Presbyterian
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); cf Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)
(The "door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any govern-
mental regulation of religious beliefs as such."); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78 (1944) (evidence concerning truth or falsity of religious beliefs properly with-
held from jury); In re Estate of Supple, 247 Cal. App. 2d 410, 55 Cal. Rptr. 542
(1966) (inquiry into truth or falsity of religious beliefs foreclosed by first amend-
ment), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967). But cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
(8 Otto) 145 (1878) (upholding enforcement of anti-polygamy law against
Mormons); Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978) (al-
lowing tort action against defendant church for involuntary servitude and inten-
tionally tortious conduct), aff'd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979).
8. The two approaches are the "compulsory deference" approach and the
"neutral principles of law" approach. The compulsory deference approach was
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illicit inquiry into religious doctrine or practice while still permitting a
full examination of the relevant evidence presented. 9 The first of these
methods, the "compulsory deference" approach, focuses on the polity
of a given church, that is, its organizational structure or system of gov-
ernance.t 0 This approach requires civil courts to enforce the decisions
arrived at by a majority of the members in a local congregational church
or, in the case of a hierarchical church, to defer to decisions of an appro-
priate church tribunal." I The second method, the "neutral principles of
law" approach, requires civil courts to scrutinize religious and secular
documents using purely legal principles, "and not to rely on religious
precepts in determining whether the documents indicate that the parties
have intended to create a trust" in favor of the diocesan church organi-
first described in Watson v.Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). For a discus-
sion of the Watson compulsory deference approach and its later development,
see infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
The neutral principles of law approach was first endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). For a discussion of Jones and the
neutral principles of law approach, see infra notes 9, 49-67 and accompanying
text.
9. The compulsory deference approach articulated in Watson v. Jones, seeks
to avoid a forbidden inquiry into religious doctrine or practice by automatically
deferring to decisions of appropriate church authorities on ecclesiastical issues.
See 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.
Similarly, the neutral principles approach introduced inJones v. Wo/f seeks to
avoid civil court entanglement in doctrinal matters by examining only those pro-
visions contained within religious documents, constitutions and canons that are
purely secular and devoid of any religious content. 443 U.S. at 603-04. The
neutral principles approach also permits an examination of purely secular docu-
ments, such as articles of incorporation, trust instruments and deeds, which pose
no threat of an unconstitutional inquiry into doctrine. Id. at 604.
10. Under the compulsory deference approach, the Supreme Court has
characterized churches as either congregational or hierarchical. Watson, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) at 722-23. Congregational churches are those that are "strictly in-
dependent of other ecclesiastical associations" in that they are governed solely
from within local congregations. Id. at 724. The compulsory deference ap-
proach requires that property disputes within congregational churches be re-
solved according to majority vote of local parishioners or by decision of elected
parish officers. Id. at 725.
Hierarchical churches, in contrast, are subordinate members of "some gen-
eral church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals"
which exercise complete authority over affiliated congregations. Id. at 722-23.
Under the compulsory deference approach, civil courts faced with disputes
within hierarchical churches must defer to decisions rendered by an appropriate
church decision-making body on questions of "discipline, or of faith, or ecclesi-
astical rule, custom, or law." Id. at 727. The United States Supreme Court has
not yet held that a church could be hierarchical as to dogma but congregational,
or self-governing, as to property ownership. For a discussion of a Kentucky
Supreme Court decision, Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 759 S.W.2d
583 (Ky. 1988), adopting this position, see infra notes 143-62 and accompanying
text.
11. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-03; Serbian, 426 U.S. at 724-25; Watson, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) at 727. For a complete discussion of the Watson compulsory defer-
ence approach, see infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
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zation, regardless of its organizational structure.' 2 Both approaches
have been used in recent cases to resolve church property disputes
within the Episcopal Church.' 3
In Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 4 the Kentucky Supreme
Court was faced with the question of whether to apply a compulsory
deference or neutral principles approach in a case involving the seces-
sion of a local church majority from a national hierarchical church. 15
Kentucky precedent had applied the compulsory deference approach to
12. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04. The Supreme Court's recognition of the
neutral principles approach can be traced to the case of Maryland & Va. Eldership
of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc. 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per
curiam). In Sharpsburg, the Maryland Court of Appeals had decided a church
property dispute by examining state statutes governing church property owner-
ship, language in deeds, charters of the church corporations and the diocesan
constitution. Id. at 367. Affirming the decision per curiam, the Supreme Court
found that the Maryland court's approach was constitutionally proper in that it
involved "no inquiry into religious doctrine." Id. at 368. Justice Brennan, in his
concurring opinion, asserted that "a State may adopt any one of various ap-
proaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consider-
ation of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets
of faith." Id. at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Eight years later in Jones, the Court adopted the rationale of Justice Bren-
nan's concurrence in Sharpsburg and went on to outline in detail the application
of neutral principles of law to church property disputes:
The neutral-principles method . . . requires a civil court to examine
certain religious documents, such as a church constitution, for lan-
guage of trust in favor of the general church. In undertaking such an
examination, a civil court must take special care to scrutinize the docu-
ment in purely secular terms, and not to rely on religious precepts in
determining whether the document indicates that the parties have in-
tended to create a trust. In addition, there may be cases where the
deed, the corporate charter, or the constitution of the general church
incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating to the owner-
ship of property. If in such a case the interpretation of the instruments
of ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious contro-
versy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue
by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.
Jones, 443 U.S. at 604 (citation omitted). The Court envisioned a gradual elimi-
nation of civil court involvement in religious property disputes as religious orga-
nizations restructured their property relationships in purely legal terms. Id.
13. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604. The following recent state cases have utilized a
compulsory deference or neutral principles approach to resolve church property
disputes: Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 541 (neutral principles), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Bishop & Diocese
v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85 (Colo.) (neutral principles), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 826
(1986); Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 759 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1988)
(neutral principles); Bennison v. Sharp, 121 Mich. App. 705, 329 N.W.2d 466
(1982) (compulsory deference); Tea v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 96 Nev.
399, 610 P.2d 182 (1980) (compulsory deference); Protestant Episcopal Church
v. Graves, 83 NJ. 572, 417 A.2d 19 (1980) (compulsory deference), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1131 (1981).
14. 759 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1988).
15. Id. For a discussion of the facts of Bjorkman, see infra notes 143-62 and
accompanying text.
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cases involving hierarchical churches so that the inevitable result was
always "the triumph of the hierarchical organization."' 6 The Bjorkman
court held that while the Episcopal Church was hierarchical, the author-
ity of the church hierarchy was exclusively ecclesiastical and did not ex-
tend to the "temporal affairs" of the local parish. 17 Thus, the Bjorkman
court held that church decisions on property matters did not warrant
compulsory deference and that the neutral principles of law approach
was preferable for deciding disputes over property within the Episcopal
Church.' 8 The Bjorkman court went on to apply a narrow neutral princi-
ples approach which excluded intrinsically religious evidence' 9 from re-
view and instead looked solely to legal documents and the past conduct
of the church and its members in matters concerning property.
This Note examines the analysis employed in Bjorkman and in sev-
eral other recent state court opinions involving the Episcopal Church in
an attempt to demonstrate the impact the Bjorkman rationale will have in
the law of church property dispute resolution.20 Part II reviews the his-
tory of the Episcopal Church in the United States, the Supreme Court's
development of the compulsory deference and neutral principles ap-
proaches, and the application of those approaches at the state court
level. Part III highlights the Bjorkman court's conclusion that property
16. Bjorkman, 759 S.W.2d at 586.
17. Id. at 586-87.
18. Id. at 586.
19. The evidence that civil courts must review in deciding religious prop-
erty disputes can be separated into three zones, represented by the following
simple illustration:
Zone I contains purely secular evidence, such as deeds, corporate charters
and trust instruments, which pose no threat of an impermissible inquiry into
religious doctrine or faith.
Zone 2 encompasses purely religious evidence, such as scripture and canon
law, which is outside a civil court's first amendment purview.
The evidence in Zone 3, occupying a position where Zone I and Zone 2
overlap, includes a mix of secular and religious components. Civil courts wish-
ing to rely on evidence in this hybrid zone must excise secular provisions from
language and concepts imbued with religious doctrine in such a way that the
surviving secular language, dissected from its religious context, adequately re-
flects the legal expectations and intent of a church and its members. For a dis-
cussion of why evidence in Zone 3, as well as Zone 2, should be excluded from
civil court review, see infra note 177 and accompanying text.
20. The scope of this Note will be limited to cases involving the Episcopal
Church in the United States of America, otherwise known as the Episcopal
Church. For a discussion of the historical development of the Episcopal Church
in the United States, see infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
1990] NOTE 953
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matters are beyond the hierarchical authority of Episcopal bishops and
the national Episcopal Church, as well as the Bjorkman court's rejection
of intrinsically religious evidence in applying the neutral principles of
law doctrine. 2 ' Part III also questions the wisdom of relying on reli-
gious documents and canon law provisions in deciding purely legal is-
sues.2 2 Part IV concludes that a proper neutral principles inquiry
should eschew intrinsically religious evidence, resulting in a more uni-
form, predictable and simple application of the law.2 3
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Considerations
An integral element of the American Revolution was an anti-colo-
nial rejection of the ecclesiastical authority of the Church of England. 24
Until 1785, there were no Episcopal bishops in the colonies and the
Bishop of London had jurisdiction over all colonial parishes.2 5 Because
there was no colonial bishop, churches were never formally con-
secrated.2 6 Consequently, local congregations in the colonies emerged
as the primary unit of the Episcopal Church in America.2 7 Ownership of
21. For a discussion of the relative merits of a narrow application of the
neutral principles approach, see infra notes 18 1-90 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the dubious legal significance of church constitu-
tions, canons and other religious documents in this context, see infra notes 171-
77 and accompanying text.
23. For a complete discussion of why a proper neutral principles inquiry
should avoid intrinsically religious evidence, see infra notes 171-91 and accom-
panying text.
24. See R. ALBRIGHT, A HISTORY OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH
103 (1964).
25. J. ADDISON, THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES: 1789-1931
59 (1969). Samuel Seabury, who eventually became the Episcopal Church's first
American Bishop, sailed from America in July of 1783 seeking consecration by
the Bishop of London. Id. Seabury was turned down because he refused to take
an oath of allegiance to the crown which was required for consecration. Id. Sea-
bury was finally consecrated as a Bishop in November, 1784, by the Nonjuror
Bishops of Scotland and arrived back in America in the Spring of 1785 as the
first American Bishop of the Episcopal Church. See id. at 58-59; R. ALBRICHT,
supra note 24, at 11, 130.
26. See N. BURR, THE STORY OF THE DIOCESE OF CONNECTICUT: A NEW
BRANCH OF THE VINE 68-69 (1962).
27. D. STEVICK, CANON LAW: A HANDBOOK 87-88 (1965).
The parishes had some strength, and they were later reluctant to con-
cede much of it to diocesan control. Dioceses were, in effect, federa-
tions of parishes. Very serious restrictions have been placed on the
bishop's power to govern. In the calling and moving of clergy, in the
closing or relocating of parishes, the bishop's will is dependent on the
consent of the parties involved-and there is a long tradition of disregarding
the bishop! A parish can become self-absorbed and withdrawn from re-
sponsible participation in the larger affairs of the diocese. In man ' ways
the structure of the Episcopal Church seems to imply that the parish is the primary
reality, and the diocese is secondar
, 
and derived.
Id. (emphasis added).
954 [Vol. 35: p. 949
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parish church property, typically, was in local hands.28 Thus, in the ab-
sence of any truly local episcopacy to assert hierarchical control over the
day-to-day affairs of colonial parishes, there evolved an essentially local
style of church property ownership in the American colonies. 29
Set against these historical underpinnings of local parish indepen-
dence is the formal structure of governance of the Episcopal Church as
set forth in its constitutions and canons.3 0 The church government is
essentially parliamentary and is governed by a bicameral General Con-
vention consisting of the House of Bishops and the House of Depu-
ties.3 ' Either house may originate and propose legislation, which must
be voted on and approved by both houses.3 2
From the late nineteenth century to the present, various efforts to
shift control of parish property away from local congregations towards
the diocesan and national hierarchies resulted in amendments to Episco-
pal canon law.3 3 These amendments, passed by the General Conven-
tion and later added to many diocesan constitutions, restricted the
alienation of church property without consent of the bishop and de-
clared local church property to be held in trust for the general church.3 4
28. See, e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815) (parish minister
seised of parish property and capable of transmitting same to his successor);
Calkins v. Cheney, 92 I1. 463, 476-77 (1879) (title held by trustees of incorpo-
rated religious society, consisting of local congregation); Bjorkman, 759 S.W.2d
583 (title held by local congregation); Tea v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 96
Nev. 399, 610 P.2d 182 (1980) (title held by local church corporation); Protes-
tant Episcopal Church v. Graves, 83 NJ. 572, 417 A.2d 19 (1980) (legal title
held by rector, warden and vestrymen of local church).
29. For a discussion of the historically local style of church property owner-
ship in the Episcopal Church in this country, see supra notes 24-28 and accompa-
nying text.
30. CONSTITUTION & CANONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PROTESTANT
EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA preamble (1982) [herein-
after CONSTITUTION & CANONS].
31. See CONSTITUTION & CANONS, supra note 30, art. I, sec. 1. The House of
Bishops consists of bishops of the church, bishop coadjutors, suffragan bishops,
assistant bishops and retired bishops. Id. sec. 2. The House of Deputies con-
sists of deacons and lay representatives elected from individual dioceses. Id.
sec. 4. The Episcopal Church is affiliated with the Anglican Communion and the
See of Canterbury. Id. preamble. The church's constitution, adopted by general
convention in Philadelphia in October, 1789, and amended in later general con-
ventions, governs the organization of the church and its missionary jurisdictions.
Id. For a history of the church's development in England and the United States,
see J. ADDISON, supra note 25; R. ALBRIGHT, supra note 24.
32. See CONSTITUTION & CANONS, supra note 30, art. I, sec. 1.
33. E. WHITE &J. DYKMAN, ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION AND CANONS FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 480-81 (1981).
34. The first of these provisions appeared in an amendment passed by the
General Convention of the Episcopal Church in 1868 which purported to pro-
hibit a parish from encumbering or alienating its property without consent of
the bishop. E. WHITE & J. DYKMAN, supra note 33, at 478 (citing to provision
currently in CONSTITUTION & CANONS, supra note 30, tit. I, canon 6, sec. 3). The
9551990] NOTE
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Despite these canon law restrictions, the status of local church property
ownership within the Episcopal Church remains far from settled; the re-
sult has been considerable litigation throughout the church's history.3 5
B. The Polity Approach of Watson v. Jones and Compulsory Deference
The first church property dispute heard by the United States
Supreme Court was the 1871 case of Watson v. Jones.36 In Watson, pro-
slavery and abolitionist factions of a Kentucky Presbyterian congrega-
tion clashed in a dispute over the ownership of local parish property. 37
The Watson Court introduced a polity-based approach to the resolution
of church property disputes, focusing upon the organizational structure
of the religious institution involved.3 8 If the church was hierarchical in
nature, civil courts were required to defer to the decision of the appro-
priate church tribunal.3 9 In the case of a church chiefly congregational
amendment contained a proviso, however, that "this section shall not be opera-
tive in any state with the laws of which, relating to the title and holding of prop-
erty by religious corporations, the same may conflict." E. WHITE &J. DYKMAN,
supra note 33, at 478. This amendment and a second amendment passed in
1871 were enacted in response to the secession of Christ Church in Chicago,
wherein the seceding congregation was eventually allowed to retain possession
of local church property. Calkins v. Cheney, 92 I1. 463 (1879). The 1871
amendment made consecration of a local church contingent upon full satisfac-
tion of any mortgage and a sufficient showing that the deed to the church made
further alienation possible only by consent of the bishop. Id. at 480-81; see also
CONSTITUTION & CANONS, supra note 30, tit. II, canon 7, sec. 1. Even stronger
language favoring the national church was added in 1904 and 1973. See E.
WHITE &J. DYKMAN, supra note 33, at 481. It is extremely doubtful that these
canon provisions are of any legal significance. "[Tihe power of the General
Convention over the disposition of real property is questionable, governed as it
is by the law of the state in which it is situated." E. WHITE &J. DYKMAN, supra
note 33, at 297; see also Calkins v. Cheney, 92 11. 463 (1879) (amendments to
Illinois religious corporations law ineffective to create trust in favor of diocese).
35. For a listing of recent cases involving property disputes within the Epis-
copal Church, see the cases cited supra note I.
36. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). In Watson, the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church passed a resolution requiring all new applicants for pas-
toral positions to take an anti-slavery oath. Id. at 691. A majority of the Walnut
Street Presbyterian Church in Louisville, Kentucky supported the oath require-
ment. Id. at 693. A dissenting minority, however, controlled the parish govern-
ment. Id. This pro-slavery minority seized control of the church and purported
to affiliate with the "Presbyterian Church of the Confederate States." Id. at 692.
The General Assembly awarded possession of the church property to the loyal
faction. Id. A state court ruled in favor of the pro-slavery minority. Id. at 690.
The anti-slavery faction then commenced a concurrent federal diversity action.
Id. at 694. The federal court granted possession of the church property to the
anti-slavery faction. Id. at 699-700.
37. Id.
38. See id. Justice Miller, writing for the majority, began by classifying
church property disputes into three categories: express trust cases, congrega-
tional church cases and cases involving hierarchical churches. Id. at 722-23.
39. See id. at 726-27. The W1'atson Court decided that a local congregation
was hierarchically controlled if it was "a member of a much larger and more
956 [Vol. 35: p. 949
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in organization, the reviewing court was directed to enforce the decision
of a majority of local church members. 40 Implicit in the Court's analysis
was a threshold determination of whether the organizational structure of
a given religious institution was congregational or hierarchical in pol-
ity.4 1 After setting forth this polity approach, the Watson Court con-
cluded that in a hierarchically structured church where there was a
property dispute between a subordinate local parish and a diocesan or
general church, civil courts must accept the authoritative ruling of the
appropriate tribunal within the hierarchy. 42
Almost sixty years after its decision in Watson, the Court in Gonzalez
v. Roman Catholic Archbishop43 suggested that it might review decisions of
hierarchical church authorities for "fraud, collusion or arbitrariness" in
determining whether compulsory deference was appropriate. 4 4 The
important religious organization... under its government and control, and...
bound by its orders and judgments." Id. at 726-27. In hierarchical churches, a
civil court would be bound to enforce the decision of the highest-ranking church
decision-making body to which a dispute had been taken. See id. at 727.
40. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 725. The Court began by noting that in
cases where property was donated with specific instructions that it be used for
the propagation of certain religious tenets, courts should give effect to the terms
of the donative instrument. Id. at 723-24. Absent specific trust provisions, two
further methods applied. First, in locally autonomous congregational churches,
or those "ow[ing] no fealty or obligation to any higher authority," the decision
of the majority of parishioners would prevail in the property dispute. Id. at 722,
724-25. For a discussion of the second method, compulsory deference in hierar-
chical churches, see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
41. The purpose of the inquiry was to decide whether a given religious or-
ganization was congregational, and thus governed by majority rule, or hierarchi-
cal, warranting compulsory deference to church authorities. tatson, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) at 722-27.
42. The Watson Court determined that the local Presbyterian congregation
was part of a hierarchical church polity. Id. at 726-27. The Court reasoned that
unquestioning deference to church authority was justified in such cases because
those who join a church impliedly consent to its governing power and are thus
bound by it. Id. at 729. The Court also recognized the particular expertise of
church tribunals in resolving ecclesiastical disputes and a correlative disability of
civil courts in adjudicating religious controversies. Id. The Court stated:
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to
practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine
which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which
does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no
heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.
Id. at 728 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86
(1944) ("Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what
they cannot prove.").
43. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
44. Id. at 16. The Court modified its compulsory deference rule in Gonzalez.
In Gonzalez, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a lower court order which had
directed an archbishop to appoint a ten-year-old boy to an ecclesiastical chap-
laincy created in 1820 pursuant to a will. Id. at 19. The archbishop applied
then-current canon law provisions in refusing to make the appointment, rather
than applying canon law in existence at the time the chaplaincy was created,
which might have yielded a contrary result. Id. at 13-15.
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Court later rejected this exception to the compulsory deference ap-
proach on the grounds that it might involve an impermissible inquiry
into religious doctrine or practice.4 5 The Court also hinted that a neu-
tral principles of law approach, which would permit an inquiry into secu-
Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, began by ruling that decisions on
canon law were properly left to religious authorities. Id. at 16. The Court lik-
ened the situation to the judicial deference given to established judicatory bod-
ies of clubs and civil associations. Id. at 16-17. The Court diluted some of the
force of Watson's compulsory deference rule, however, by holding that civil
courts could review church decisions for "fraud, collusion or arbitrariness." Id
at 16. The Gonzalez Court also hinted that only decisions by "proper church
tribunals" would be accepted as conclusive, and then only if rendered on "mat-
ters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights." Id. The Court implic-
itly recognized that while parishioners may impliedly consent to the hierarchical
authority of the churches they join, there are limits to their consent. Id. While
the Supreme Court later rejected this fraud, collusion or arbitrariness exception
to compulsory deference in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), the reasoning in Gonzalez
demonstrates both the Court's uneasiness with religious evidence such as canon
law provisions, and a desire to give effect to the legal expectations of the parties.
45. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presby-
terian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). Hull Church involved a church property dis-
pute which arose after two local churches withdrew from the Presbyterian
Church over doctrinal changes. Id. at 441. The Georgia Supreme Court applied
a departure-from-doctrine test mandated by state law which inquired whether
the general church had abandoned the doctrinal tenets it had followed at the
time the local church had affiliated with it. Id. The Georgia court found a "sub-
stantial abandonment" of the denomination's original tenets, working a forfei-
ture of the general church's implied trust in the disputed church property. Id. at
443-44.
In reversing the Georgia high court, the Supreme Court began by reaffirm-
ing its holding in Watson that "civil courts [have] no role in determining ecclesi-
astical questions in the process of resolving [church] property disputes." Id. at
447. The Court noted a similar infirmity in Georgia's two-step departure-from-
doctrine test. Id. at 449-50. Under that test, a court must first decide whether
the general church's actions depart substantially from prior doctrine, an inquiry
necessitating an interpretation of church teachings. Id. at 450. Second, if a
court decides there has been a substantial departure from doctrine, it must then
decide if the departure is grave enough, in the theological context, to warrant
forfeiture of the trust assets. Id. The Court held that such an inquiry "would
require the civil courts to engage in the forbidden process of interpreting and
weighing church doctrine." Id. at 451.
The Hull Church Court went on to express concern that its refinements on
the Watson rule, especially the fraud, collusion or arbitrariness exception in Gon-
zalez, might involve courts in an impermissible inquiry into religious doctrine
and practice unless narrowly applied to non-ecclesiastical matters. Hull Church,
393 U.S. at 450-51. The fraud, collusion or arbitrariness exception to the com-
pulsory deference approach remained viable for a time. See Maryland & Va. El-
dership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S.
367, 369 n.3 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese
v. Milivojevich, however, the Court's misgivings about the "constitutional evils"
of reviewing church decisions using secular notions of due process and funda-
mental fairness compelled it to reject the fraud, collusion or arbitrariness excep-
tion to compulsory deference. 426 U.S. 696, 713-20 (1976). For a discussion of
the compulsory deference approach of Watson and Gonzalez, see supra notes 8-10,
44 and accompanying text.
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lar provisions contained in religious constitutions, canons and
documents, might be a permissible alternative to the compulsory defer-
ence approach.4 6 It was not until 1979, over one hundred years after
Watson, that the Court, inJones v. Wolf,4 7 endorsed the neutral principles
approach as a constitutionally acceptable rationale for resolving reli-
gious property disputes. 48
C. Jones v. Wolf and Neutral Principles
Jones involved a schism within the Presbyterian Church. 49 In Jones, a
majority of the parishioners in the Vineville Presbyterian Church of Ma-
con, Georgia voted to disaffiliate from the Presbyterian Church in the
United States 50 and join the Presbyterian Church in America. 5 1 A
church property dispute between seceding and loyal factions ensued. 5 2
The Georgia Supreme Court applied neutral principles of law in exam-
ining deeds, state statutes dealing with implied trusts, the local church's
charter and the constitution of the general church. 53 The Georgia court
determined that the local congregation, represented by the majority of
parishioners, was entitled to the property.5 4
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court confronted two issues:
46. In dicta, the Court suggested that a constitutionally perilous inquiry
could be avoided through the application of "neutral principles of law, devel-
oped for use in all property disputes." Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 449. In this way,
the Hull Church Court seemed to hint at a possible alternative approach to the
church property problem, while reaffirming the validity of the polity-compulsory
deference approach of Watson and Gonzalez. For a complete discussion of the
Supreme Court's development of the neutral principles approach, see supra note
12 and accompanying text.
47. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). For a discussion of the facts of Jones, see infra
notes 49-70 and accompanying text.
48. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's endorsement of the neutral
principles of law approach in Jones, see infra notes 49-67 and accompanying text.
49. Jones, 443 U.S. at 597.
50. The Presbyterian Church in the United States is also known as the Pres-
byterian Church, or simply, PCUS. Id.
51. Id. at 598. At a meeting attended by a quorum of the congregation, 164
members, including the pastor, voted to secede from the Presbyterian Church,
while 94 members opposed the resolution. Id.
52. Id. at 598-99. The Presbyterian Church is hierarchically organized as
follows: local church, Session, Presbytery, Synod and General Assembly. Id. at
598. Actions or decisions by each branch are subject to review and control of
the next higher branch, respectively. Id.
After part of the Vineville congregation voted to secede, the Augusta-Ma-
con Presbytery appointed a commission to investigate. Id. The commission de-
clared the loyal minority to be the "true congregation" and withdrew all official
authorization from the secessionist majority which was in possession of the par-
ish property. Id. The loyal minority faction then instituted a class action in state
court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief establishing the minority's right
to exclusive possession and use of the church property. Id. at 598-99.
53. Id. at 601.
54. See id.
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whether the first and fourteenth amendments permitted the Georgia
Supreme Court to apply neutral principles of law to a religious property
dispute and, if not, whether the state court should have deferred to the
decision of the hierarchical church authority in deciding the property
dispute. 5 5 The Jones majority approved of the Georgia court's decision
to apply a neutral principles of law approach56 and in so doing endorsed
the neutral principles approach as constitutionally permissible. 57 Under
this approach, civil courts were required to defer to doctrinal decisions
rendered by hierarchical church authorities, but were free to undertake
any inquiry not tainted by "the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets
of faith." 58 The Court noted that the neutral principles approach relies
on secular trust and property concepts, thus enabling courts to avoid
examination of forbidden doctrinal matters while still permitting an ex-
amination of valuable secular evidence.5 9 Furthermore, the Court noted
55. The decision of the authoritative tribunal in Jones was rendered by a
commission appointed by the Augusta-Macon Presbytery to investigate and re-
solve the dispute. Id. at 598. In a written ruling, the commission declared that
"the minority faction constituted 'the true congregation of Vineville Presbyte-
rian Church,' and withdr[ew] from the majority faction 'all authority to exercise
office derived from [PCUS].' " Id. (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 604. The vote in Jones was 5-4. Id. at 596. Justice Blackmun deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Rehnquist
and Stevens. Justice Powell dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Stewart and White. Id.
57. Id. at 604. TheJones Court specifically noted that
[tihe primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that it
is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accom-
modate all forms of religious organization and polity. The method re-
lies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and
property law familiar to lawyers andjudges. It thereby promises to free
civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious
doctrine, polity, and practice. Furthermore, the neutral-principles
analysis shares the peculiar genius of private-law systems in general-
flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to reflect the inten-
tions of the parties.
Id. at 603.
58. Id. at 602 (quoting Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v.
Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. at 368 (1970) (Brennan,J., concur-
ring)). TheJones Court did not discuss what other approaches might be permis-
sible. See id. Various other approaches have been proposed. See, e.g., ElIman,
Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CALIF. L.
REV. 1378, 1402 (1981) (contract-based approach honoring "internal church
agreements, just as a court would honor internal agreements of a secular organi-
zation"); Sirico, supra note 1, at 357 ("secular documents test" restricting admis-
sible evidence to "secular provisions appearing in deeds, corporation papers,
and other legal documents").
59. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603; see also Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches
of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 369 n.2, 370 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Clivil courts can determine ownership by studying
deeds, reverter clauses, and general state corporation laws."). For purposes of
the neutral principles approach, the term "secular evidence" refers to purely
secular provisions contained within church constitutions, canon law provisions
and religious documents, as well as to articles of incorporation, deeds and state
960 [Vol. 35: p. 949
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that such an approach would encourage churches to order their affairs in
advance of a schism to reflect the intentions of churches and their mem-
bers by translating these intentions into purely secular terms accessible
to any lawyer or judge. 60 The Jones Court stressed, however, that civil
courts must strictly avoid interpreting documents tainted by religious
concepts or doctrine.6 1
In a strong dissent, Justice Powell argued that the neutral principles
approach condoned by the majority deprived courts of relevant informa-
tion by excluding from review evidence germane to the dispute but
tainted by doctrinal concepts and religious tenets.6 2 The dissent also
statutes governing church property ownership. Jones, 443 U.S. at 600-06; Sharps-
burg, 396 U.S. at 370. In this regard, it is important to note that courts may not
apply neutral principles of law to evidence of a religious nature if doing so
would require resolution of doctrinal issues. See Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. at 370; see
also Sirico, supra note 1, at 335, 353; Sirico, supra note 5, at 43-48, 51-68.
60. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04. The Court stated:
Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, reli-
gious societies can specify what is to happen to church property in the
event of a particular contingency, or what religious body will determine
the ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal controversy. In this
manner, a religious organization can ensure that a dispute over the
ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with the
desires of the members.
Id. Encouraging Episcopal churches to translate their intentions into legally
cognizable terms will allow church members themselves to control those aspects
of church life that affect legal relationships and will free civil courts from an
often perilous inquiry into the internal workings of religious institutions. See
Sirico, supra note 1, at 359.
61. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604; see also Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. at 370 ("[G]eneral
principles of property law may not be relied upon if their application requires
civil courts to resolve doctrinal issues.").
62. Jones, 443 U.S. at 611-12 (Powell, J., dissenting). In arguing that the
neutral principles approach was unduly restrictive in the scope of evidence it
permits courts to review, Justice Powell wrote:
One effect of the Court's evidentiary rule is to deny the courts relevant
evidence as to the religious polity-that is, the form of governance-
adopted by the church members. The constitutional documents of
churches tend to be drawn in terms of religious precepts. Attempting
to read them "in purely secular terms" is more likely to promote confu-
sion than understanding. Moreover, whenever religious polity has not
been expressed in specific statements referring to the property of a
church, there will be no evidence of that polity cognizable under the
neutral-principles rule. Lacking such evidence, presumably a court will
impose some rule of church government derived from state law. In the
present case, for example, the general and unqualified authority of the
Presbytery over the actions of the Vineville church had not been ex-
pressed in secular terms of control of its property. As a consequence,
the Georgia courts could find no acceptable evidence of this authorita-
tive relationship, and they imposed instead a congregational form of
government determined from state law.
This limiting of the evidence relative to religious government can-
not be justified on the ground that it "free[s] civil courts completely
from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and
practice."
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argued that, by granting control to the seceding faction, the Georgia
courts had effectively reversed the doctrinal decision of an authoritative
church decision-making body.63 Justice Powell contended that this was
Id. at 612-13 (Powell, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice Powell added:
The neutral-principles approach appears to assume that the re-
quirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if civil courts are forbid-
den to consider certain types of evidence. The First Amendment's
Religion Clauses, however, are meant to protect churches and their
members from civil law interference, not to protect the courts from
having to decide difficult evidentiary questions.
Id. at 613-14 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
63. While noting thatJones dealt with the Presbyterian Church, it is fruitful
to examine in the Episcopal Church context Justice Powell's imperative that civil
courts not meddle in the established decisional process of a given church. Such
an analysis raises the issue whether, indeed, there exists an authoritative tribunal
within the Episcopal Church with legitimate authority in church property mat-
ters. See id. at 613 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The constitutions and canons of the Episcopal Church do not provide per se
for a decision-making body to exercise authority over church property matters.
See CONSTrrtUbON & CANONS, supra note 30. In the Annotated Constitution and Ca-
nons of the Episcopal Church, for example, the authors explain that the English
sentence of deprivation, whereby a clergyman is deprived of his salary and the
emoluments pertaining to his rectorship, is not found in the American ecclesias-
tical jurisprudence. E. WHITE &J. DYKMAN, supra note 33, at 1109. This absence
is "due to the principle . . . that it was not competent for [Episcopal] church
tribunals to pass on questions pertaining to the rights of real or personal prop-
erty, as such questions are to be judged by the civil courts." Id. The constitu-
tion and canons do provide for a tribunal for disciplining pastoral office holders.
See, e.g., CONSTIrtON & CANONS, supra note 30, art. IX (providing for trials of
bishops, presbyters and deacons and providing for courts of review and of ap-
peal), tit. IV, canon 12 (pertaining to sentences imposed on clergy).
The issue of whether or not there is a tribunal with authority over property
matters in the Episcopal Church has never been addressed directly by the
Supreme Court. The Watson Court, however, stated that courts must defer to
hierarchical church authority where "there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals
with a general and ultimate power of control more or less complete, in some
supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general organization."
Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722-23. Later, in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, the Court reiterated the importance of an appropriate church tribu-
nal with authority over property matters by stating that
the First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious or-
ganizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal dis-
cipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating
disputes over these matters. When this choice is exercised and ecclesi-
astical tribunals are created to decide disputes over the government
and direction of subordinate bodies, the Constitution requires that civil
courts accept their decisions as binding upon them.
426 U.S. 696, 724-25 (1976). The Court, however, did find the "fraud, collusion
or arbitrariness" standard articulated in Gonzalez to be a prohibited inquiry into
religious rule, custom and law and thereby overruled Gonzalez on the point. Id.
at 712-15. Then, in Jones, the Court noted that the Constitution "requires that
civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the
highest court of a hierarchical church organization." Jones, 443 U.S. at 602.
Dispensing with any requirement of some formal religious decision-making
body as a basis for invoking compulsory deference would seem to foreordain a
decision in favor of the hierarchical church in all cases where the hierarchical
14
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tantamount to a direct decision on doctrine and practice.64
The majority injones agreed with the basic approach adopted by the
Georgia Supreme Court to resolve the church property dispute. 65 The
case was remanded, however, for a decision on whether Georgia reli-
gious incorporation law required that the identity of the true congrega-
tion of Vineville Church be determined by the "laws and regulations" of
the general church.66 If so, the Court noted, the first amendment would
require that deference be given to the general church's determination. 67
Following this endorsement by the Supreme Court inJones, several
state courts have attempted to apply the neutral principles of law ap-
proach. 68 An examination of these decisions, however, reveals thatJones
has engendered considerable confusion concerning the permissible evi-
church merely claims a right, in whatever capacity, to the local church property.
For example, consider if a diocese were to set up a church property tribunal
without real authority to do so. Would a decision by such a body in favor of the
diocese warrant compulsory deference under the Watson polity approach? Ar-
guably, deference to such a decision by a sham tribunal would sacrifice the indi-
vidual rights of church members. "To afford to individual members of a church
no protection whatever against usurpation on the part of those in power is not
only a travesty on justice but a blow in the face of the doctrine of religious lib-
erty." A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 533
(1964). But see Kefroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1952)
("There are occasions when civil courts must draw lines between the responsi-
bilities of church and state for the disposition or use of property. Even in those
cases when the property follows as an incident from decisions of the church cus-
tom or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls.").
64. Jones, 443 U.S. at 613 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell suggested
that unless civil courts reach the same decision as the hierarchical church, they
would effectively be reversing a doctrinal decision by the "church courts." Id.
(Powell, J., dissenting). Recall that in Jones, a commission appointed by the Au-
gusta-Macon Presbytery had ruled in favor of the diocesan church. Jones, 443
U.S. at 598. Jones involved the Presbyterian Church. For a discussion of the
proposition that the constitutions and canons of the Episcopal Church do not
provide for a decisional body having authority over property matters, see supra
note 63 and accompanying text.
65. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604. The Court noted that the Georgia court was
bound by a statute requiring that " 'church property be held according to the
terms of the church government,' " providing that a local church affiliated with a
hierarchical religious organization " 'is part of the whole body of the general
church and is subject to the higher authority of the organization and its laws and
regulations.' " Id. at 608 (citation omitted). The Court cautioned that the first
amendment required deference to the "presbyterial commission's determination
of that church's identity," under the terms of the Georgia law. Id. at 609.
66. Jones, 443 U.S. at 609-10. The Court decided that the Georgia Supreme
Court's grounds for awarding the disputed church property to the local congre-
gation "remain[ed] unarticulated." Id. at 610. The Court therefore vacated the
judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court and remanded the case. Id.
67. Id. at 609.
68. See, e.g., Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599,
171 Cal. Rptr. 541, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Bishop & Diocese v. Mote,
716 P.2d 85 (Colo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 826 (1986); Bjorkman, 759 S.W.2d 583
(Ky.). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 112-62 and accompanying
text.
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dentiary scope of a neutral principles analysis. 6 9 Jones has also fostered
an apparent misapprehension of the subtle realities involved in many
church property cases within the Episcopal Church. 70
D. Application of Compulsory Deference and Neutral Principles
at the State Level
The Supreme Court's ruling in Jones introduced neutral principles
as an alternative to the one-hundred-year-old Watson compulsory defer-
ence legacy. 7 1 Accordingly, some states have eagerly adopted the neu-
tral principles approach, 72 while others have continued to practice
compulsory deference. 7" Some states upholding the compulsory defer-
ence approach have borrowed from the neutral principles approach to
either decide as a threshold matter whether a church is hierarchical or
congregational,7 4 or to provide an alternative rationale for their deci-
sions based on compulsory deference. 75 Thus, by injecting neutral prin-
ciples analysis into their opinions, these courts may be paving the way
for their conversion to the neutral principles of law approach in the near
future.
The courts that have openly embraced the neutral principles of law
approach have exhibited a wide disparity in both their willingness to re-
view evidence of a religious nature 76 and their reluctance to apply the
neutral principles approach to hierarchical churches. 7 7 The net trend of
these decisions, including those employing the compulsory deference
approach, seems to favor a narrow neutral principles approach that by-
passes intrinsically religious evidence altogether. 78 The implications of
this trend are twofold. First, compulsory deference courts will be more
69. For support for the proposition thatJones has fostered confusion among
courts regarding the permissible evidentiary scope of a neutral principles analy-
sis, see the cases cited supra note 68.
70. See, e.g., Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541; Mote, 716
P.2d 85 (Colo.); Bennison v. Sharp, 121 Mich. App. 705, 329 N.W.2d 466(1982); Tea v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 96 Nev. 399, 610 P.2d 182 (1980);
Protestant Episcopal Church v. Graves, 83 N.J. 572, 417 A.2d 19 (1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 72-
142 and accompanying text.
71. SeeJones, 443 U.S. at 604.
72. See, e.g., Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541; Mote, 716
P.2d 85 (Colo.); Bjorkman, 759 S.W.2d 583 (Ky.).
73. See, e.g., Bennison, 121 Mich. App. 705, 329 N.W.2d 466; Tea, 96 Nev.
399, 610 P.2d 182; Graves, 83 N.J. 572, 417 A.2d 19.
74. See, e.g., Bennison, 121 Mich. App. 705, 329 N.W.2d 466; Graves, 83 N.J.
572, 417 A.2d 19.
75. See, e.g., Bennison, 121 Mich. App. 705, 329 N.W.2d 466; Graves, 83 N.J.
572, 417 A.2d 19.
76. See, e.g., Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541; Mote, 716
P.2d 85 (Colo.); Bjorkman, 759 S.W.2d 583 (Ky.).
77. See, e.g., Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541; Mote, 716
P.2d 85 (Colo.); Bjorkman, 759 S.W.2d 583 (Ky.).
78. For a complete discussion of the trend in favor of a narrow application
964 [Vol. 35: p. 949
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willing to convert to a narrow neutral principles approach which relies
on purely secular evidence and avoids any inquiry whatsoever into reli-
gious doctrine or practice. 79 Second, a narrow construction by all
courts of the neutral principles of law approach introduced by Jones
would result in a more uniform, simple and predictable application of
the law.80
1. The Compulsoty Deference Cases
One of the first state cases involving Episcopal Church property fol-
lowing theJones decision was Tea v. Protestant Episcopal Church.8 1 In Tea, a
majority of the local congregation of St. Christopher's Church in Boul-
der City, Nevada voted to leave the Episcopal Church.8 2 The Bishop of
the Episcopal diocese sought a declaratory judgment that the local par-
ish property was held in trust for the benefit of the diocese.83
In resolving the church property dispute, the Nevada Supreme
Court, formerly a proponent of a straight compulsory deference ap-
of the neutral principles approach, see infra notes 171-90 and accompanying
text.
79. For a complete discussion of the implications of a narrow application of
the neutral principles approach, see infra notes 171-90 and accompanying text.
80. For a complete discussion of how a narrow neutral principles approach
will result in a more uniform, simple and predictable application of the law, see
infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
81. 96 Nev. 399, 610 P.2d 182 (1980).
82. Id. at 401, 610 P.2d at 183. Tea involved the church of St. Christopher
in Boulder City, Nevada, which had incorporated in 1962 as a congregation "in
communion with the Protestant Episcopal Church." Id. at 400-01, 610 P.2d at
183. St. Christopher's was incorporated in 1962, consisting of "[tihe Rector,
Church Wardens, and Vestrymen of St. Christopher's Episcopal Church in Boul-
der City, Nevada," pursuant to a state statute providing for the incorporation of
Episcopal Church parishes. Id. at 400, 610 P.2d at 183. Shortly after the parish
was incorporated, the diocesan Bishop assigned his rights under a lease to cer-
tain church property to the local congregation at St. Christopher's. Id. In 1971,
the Nevada Legislature enacted a statute which permitted the incorporation of
the Episcopal Diocese of Nevada. Id. The diocese then incorporated to include
all missions and parishes within the State of Nevada. Id. In 1977, the City of
Boulder, which had formerly leased the property to St. Christopher's, trans-
ferred the church property to the local parish corporation. Id. The deed named
the local church corporation as title holder to the property. Id. After a majority
of the local congregation voted to disaffiliate from the diocese, the Bishop pro-
ceeded to discipline the local pastor and ultimately removed him pursuant to
diocesan regulations. Id. at 401, 610 P.2d at 183.
Interestingly, the court noted that the deed to the disputed church property
was not recorded until after the majority voted to secede. Id. The timing of the
vote in relation to the recording of the deed would seem more relevant to a
neutral principles analysis.
83. Id. at 401, 610 P.2d at 183. The seceding faction of the local church,
including the rector and vestrymen, defended by claiming that the dispute was
over religious doctrine, and thus, outside of civil court jurisdiction. Id. The se-
ceding faction also attempted, unsuccessfully, to prevent the court from consid-
ering the constitution and canons of the Episcopal Church on the grounds that
doing so involved an "inquiry by the court into questions of doctrine." Id.
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proach, utilized the threshold inquiry set forth in the Jones neutral princi-
ples approach. Finding that the Episcopal Church structures of
governance were hierarchical in nature, the court then slipped back into
comfortable doctrine, ordering that deference be given to the decision
of the appropriate ecclesiastical authorities.8 4 The court reasoned that
church authorities had deemed the "true" local congregation to be the
loyal minority and that this determination required complete defer-
ence.8 5 Moreover, the court concluded, there was nothing in the state
statutes or relevant church documents granting a seceding church the
right to retain control of church property held in the name of a local
church corporation.8 6 Accordingly, the court held that title to the dis-
puted property properly belonged to the diocesan church.8 7
The approach used in Tea amounted to a preliminary neutral princi-
ples inquiry limited solely to an examination of church organizational
structure followed by the application of compulsory deference principles
in deciding the underlying property claims.8 8 Other courts espousing
84. Id. at 402, 610 P.2d at 184. This statement by the court reflects the
compulsory deference, or polity, approach enunciated in Watson v. Jones. For a
complete discussion of the Watson compulsory deference rule, see supra notes
36-42 and accompanying text. The trial court had decided that the Episcopal
Church was hierarchical and that the local church had acceded to the constitu-
tion and canons of the diocesan church. Tea, 96 Nev. at 401, 610 P.2d at 183.
The trial court had examined "regulations of the Episcopal church polity," state
statutes and "internal regulations of the church polity" which provided that lo-
cal congregations held property "subject to a trust in favor of the general
church." Id. at 402, 610 P.2d at 184. For a discussion submitting that the Epis-
copal Church is hierarchical as to dogma but congregational as to property own-
ership, see infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text. The court also found that
the diocesan constitution and canons, as well as state statutes governing the in-
corporation of churches, empowered the Bishop to control the local church cor-
poration and, therefore, the local church property as well. Tea, 96 Nev. at 401,
610 P.2d at 183.
85. Tea, 96 Nev. at 402-03, 610 P.2d at 184. The court reasoned that the
hierarchical church authorities, by "severing communion" with the seceding fac-
tion, had placed them outside the statutory definition of the "Rector," the entity
holding title to the disputed property under the 1977 deed from the City of
Boulder. Id. at 402, 610 P.2d at 184. The court concluded, therefore, that as
the legal representatives of the corporation known as the "Rector," the Bishop
and diocese were entitled to possession of the church property. Id. at 402-03,
610 P.2d at 184. For a similar treatment of corporate status as determinative of
property ownership, see infra notes 97, 108 and accompanying text.
86. Tea, 96 Nev. at 402, 610 P.2d at 184.
87. Id. at 403, 610 P.2d at 184. The court's mention of state statutes gov-
erning church incorporation suggests, though not strongly, an alternate neutral
principles rationale for its holding in favor of the diocese. In this way, Tea im-
plies that a neutral principles approach might yield a result consistent with a
compulsory deference approach.
88. Specifically, the Tea court's analysis illustrates a strict application of the
compulsory deference rule involving, first, an examination of church canons,
constitutions and other documents in order to determine if the church in ques-
tion was hierarchical or congregational and, second, in the case of a hierarchical
church, a determination of whether there was a definitive decision by a higher
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 5 [1990], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss5/7
the compulsory deference approach addressJones in dicta. While not yet
incorporating the neutral principles approach into their analyses as in
Tea, these courts have noted that a neutral principles inquiry into under-
lying property claims would yield the same result as a compulsory defer-
ence approach under the same set of facts.
8 9
One such case is Bennison v. Sharp.9° In Bennison, the Michigan
Court of Appeals confronted the issue of whether a majority faction of a
congregation which had seceded from a hierarchical church had a right
to retain church property.9 1 The governing body of the main church
had declared that the majority seceding faction was no longer the con-
gregation, or its legitimate successor, for which the property was origi-
nally purchased. 9 2 The Bishop of the diocese and a minority of the
congregation loyal to him sought control of the parish property.
93
In affirming summary judgment in favor of the Bishop, the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals adopted a compulsory deference approach. 94 The
court began its analysis by finding that the Episcopal canons and dioce-
san constitution showed that the Episcopal Church was hierarchical with
regard to property as well as spiritual matters. 9 5 Thus, the Bennison
authority warranting judicial deference. Id. For a complete discussion of the
compulsory deference approach, see supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
89. For a discussion of cases in which courts have noted that a neutral prin-
ciples inquiry into underlying property claims would yield the same result as a
compulsory deference approach under the same set of facts, see infra notes 90-
111 and accompanying text.
90. 121 Mich. App. 705, 329 N.W.2d 466 (1982).
91. Id. at 709-12, 329 N.W.2d at 468-69. St. Paul's Episcopal Church was
an ecclesiastical corporation formed in 1871 and incorporated in 1901 under
Michigan law providing for the incorporation of Episcopal churches. Id. at 709,
329 N.W.2d at 468. Legal title to the disputed church, parish house and rectory
was in the name of the local church. Id. at 709-10, 329 N.W.2d at 468. After
several doctrinal changes within the Episcopal Church, a majority of the congre-
gation involved in Bennison voted to secede from their Episcopal diocese, formed
a new ecclesiastical corporation affiliated with the Anglican Catholic Church and
deeded the church property to the new corporation. Id. at 710-11, 329 N.W.2d
at 468-69.
92. Id. at 711-12, 329 N.W.2d at 469.
93. Id. at 709, 329 N.W.2d at 468.
94. Id. at 718-21, 329 N.W.2d at 472-73.
95. Id. at 718, 329 N.W.2d at 472. Other jurisdictions, the court noted, had
recognized the Episcopal Church as hierarchical as a matter of law. Id. at 720
n. 1, 329 N.W.2d at 473 n. 1. The court stressed the hierarchical organization of
the Episcopal Church as an indication that the parties intended the decisional
authority of the diocesan church to be controlling in property matters. Id. at
719-20, 329 N.W.2d at 472-73. Here, the court seemed to equate episcopal au-
thority over religious dogma with episcopal control over property disposition.
See id. Moreover, the court found a legal relationship based largely on evidence
of an essentially religious relationship.
In effect, the court concluded that church members expected their Bishop
to have the same authority over the ownership of local church property as he
had over changes in the Book of Common Prayer. See id. Such a conclusion
belies the historical realities of local church ownership in the Episcopal Church
1990] NOTE 967
19
Bohner: Religious Property Disputes and Intrinsically Religious Evidence:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
court deferred to the governing body's decision granting control of the
property to the loyal minority. 96 The court reasoned further that a neu-
tral principles approach would yield the same result. Since the seceding
faction of the congregation had dissolved its original corporate form, it
relinquished any claim to the church property which therefore contin-
ued to be held by the original parish corporation consisting of the fac-
tion loyal to the diocese. 97
In Protestant Episcopal Church v. Graves,98 a panel of the New Jersey
Supreme Court also used a compulsory deference approach to find for a
diocesan church while stating that a neutral principles approach would
yield a similar result.99 In Graves, a majority of a local congregation
voted to secede from the Episcopal Church in response to doctrinal
changes concerning the ordination of women and changes in the Book
of Common Prayer. 0 0 The Bishop sought to enjoin the seceding pa-
rishioners from occupying the local church property.' 0 '
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, employing a compulsory defer-
ence approach, ruled that because the Episcopal Church was a hierarchi-
as well as the true expectations of church members regarding property matters.
For a discussion of the historical realities of local church ownership within the
Episcopal Church, see supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
96. See Bennison, 121 Mich. App. at 720, 329 N.W.2d at 473.
97. See id. at 725, 329 N.W.2d at 475. The Bennison court, in holding for the
loyal minority, distinguished Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, 115 Cal.
App. 3d 599, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981), in which the
seceding parishioners prevailed on appeal. The Bennison court noted that in
Barker, the seceding faction had continued to function under the local parish's
original articles of incorporation, thus retaining ownership of the church prop-
erty, whereas the parish in Bennison had dissolved its charter and re-incorporated
as an affiliate of a separate denominational church. Bennison, 121 Mich. App. at
725, 329 N.W.2d at 475 (citing Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 625, 171 Cal. Rptr. at
551). Thus, the court reasoned, the dissolution of the original parish corpora-
tion had extinguished the local congregation's right to possess the property at
issue. Id. For an example of similar reasoning by another court, see infra note
108 and accompanying text. For a complete discussion of Barker, see infra notes
130-42 and accompanying text.
98. 83 N.J. 572, 417 A.2d 19 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981).
99. Id. at 580, 417 A.2d at 24. Graves involved St. Stephen's Church which
was incorporated in 1895 as an affiliated member of the Episcopal Church. Id. at
574, 417 A.2d at 20. Until 1935, St. Stephen's did not own any property. Id.
The parish later purchased property and a chapel and affiliated buildings, using
local funds and without diocesan financial assistance. Id. at 574, 417 A.2d at 20-
21.
100. Id. at 575, 417 A.2d at 21. The parishioners of the local church
deemed these changes heretical and voted to secede. Id. At a meeting attended
by about 29% of St. Stephen's adult parishioners, a majority, including the Pas-
tor, voted to sever relations with the diocese. Id. The diocesan Bishop repri-
manded the Pastor and attempted, unsuccessfully, to replace him. Id.
101. Id. at 575, 417 A.2d at 21. The trial court granted summaryjudgment
in favor of the Bishop and entered a declaratory judgment that the parish prop-
erty not be used for any non-diocesan purposes. Id. The appeals court affirmed.
Id. at 576, 417 A.2d at 21-22.
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cal organization, the decision of the Bishop was binding.10 2 Thus, the
loyal minority retained control of the property.' 0 3 The Graves court
noted that only in the absence of hierarchical control should the neutral
principles of law approach be applied. 104 As an affiliated member of the
Episcopal Church, the local church was deemed subject to the hierarchi-
cal authority of its diocesan church. 10 5 The Graves court found that
under a neutral principles approach the diocese would still prevail over
the local congregation because the constitutions and canons of the dio-
cese made any transfer of property subject to the Bishop's approval. 10 6
Moreover, the court stated that legal title to the property was held by the
parish corporation as an affiliated member of the diocesan church.10 7
By disaffiliating themselves from the diocesan organization, the court
concluded that the local church officers had terminated their eligibility
to hold office and, therefore, lacked standing to challenge the Bishop's
actions.10 8 The court, therefore, affirmed the judgment in favor of the
diocesan church. 109
Justice Schreiber, dissenting in Graves, strongly suggested that a
church could be hierarchical as to ecclesiastical matters, but congrega-
tional as to property.' "0 Thus in cases like Graves, Justice Schreiber con-
102. Id. at 580, 417 A.2d at 24.
103. See id.
104. Id. In so doing, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling. Id.
105. Id. The court stated that "it has been established that the Protestant
Episcopal Church is a completely integrated hierarchical body, the ecclesiastical
determination of which incidentally resolves the question of control over local
church property. This is dispositive of the case." Id. For a complete discussion
of why ecclesiastical determinations should not necessarily control the legal dis-
position of church property, see infra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
106. Graves, 83 N.J. at 580-81, 417 A.2d at 24. The court relied on a state
statute governing the incorporation of Episcopal Churches which required local
parishes to obtain the consent of the bishops before alienating property. Id.
The court also noted that title I, canon 6 (now 7), sec. 4, although adopted after
the dispute in Graves arose, reflected the "established customs, practices and
usages of The Protestant Episcopal Church." Id. at 581, 417 A.2d at 24.
107. Id. at 581, 417 A.2d at 24.
108. Id. at 581-82, 417 A.2d at 24-25. The court basically equated seces-
sion from the diocese with dissolution of the parish's original corporate form.
See id. For a similar treatment of secession and corporate dissolution as disposi-
tive of underlying claims in church property disputes, see supra note 97 and ac-
companying text.
109. Graves, 83 N.J. at 582, 417 A.2d at 25.
110. Id. at 588-89, 417 A.2d at 28-29 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). The dis-
sent further criticized the notion that a local church necessarily abdicates control
of its property by affiliating with a hierarchical church. Id. at 589, 417 A.2d at
28-29 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). Justice Schreiber would have examined rele-
vant church documents to determine where the parties intended the "locus of
control" to be in case of a schism. Id. at 589, 417 A.2d at 29 (Schreiber, J.,
dissenting). A neutral principles approach, Justice Schreiber contended, would
reveal no trust provision favoring the general church and would result in the
property being awarded to the seceding local church. Id. at 592-93, 417 A.2d at
30-31 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
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tended, the decision of a hierarchical authority, while controlling on
doctrinal issues, would be irrelevant on property issues. 1 1
2. The Neutral Principles Cases
In contrast to the "measured" approaches in Tea, Graves and Ben-
nison, other courts have rejected the compulsory deference approach,
favoring a more searching neutral principles inquiry into church consti-
tutions, canons and other religious documents. " 2 In Bishop & Diocese v.
Mote, ' 3 a church property dispute arose after a local congregation se-
ceded from its diocesan church.' 14 The Bishop and a loyal faction then
sued to recover possession of the parish property from the secessionist
group. "15
111. Id. at 589, 417 A.2d at 28-29 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
112. See, e.g., Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599,
171 Cal. Rptr. 541, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Bishop & Diocese v. Mote,
716 P.2d 85 (Colo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 826 (1986).
113. Bishop & Diocese v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85 (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
826 (1986).
114. Id. at 87. A majority of the local congregation voted to secede in re-
sponse to doctrinal changes concerning the ordination of women, divorce and
changes in the Book of Common Prayer. Id. at 89. Following the approval of
the ordination of women by the General Convention of the Episcopal Church,
the St. Mary's delegation introduced a resolution at the Annual Convention of
the Diocese of Colorado calling upon the diocese to withdraw from the Episco-
pal Church. Id. The resolution was rejected and most of the St. Mary's delega-
tion walked out. Id. At a meeting of the St. Mary's congregation, the members
then voted 197 to 79 to secede from the national church and diocese and delete
from its articles of incorporation all references to hierarchical authority. Id. Fol-
lowing the secession, the Bishop formally recognized as the rightful parish the
minority which remained loyal to the diocese. Id. The loyal minority elected
new parish officers to replace those in the seceding faction, as directed by the
Bishop. Id.
115. Id. The appellants in Mote included members of the vestry represent-
ing the loyal minority of parishioners, the replacement pastor appointed by the
Bishop and the Bishop and Diocese of Colorado. Id. at 89 n.3. The trial court
reasoned that the Episcopal Church was hierarchical in polity, that the appropri-
ate church authority had recognized the loyal faction and that this decision re-
quired complete deference. Id. at 90. The court, therefore, concluded that the
original parish articles of incorporation remained in effect and that legal title to
the disputed property was vested in the new pastor as officially recognized by the
Bishop. Id. For a similar treatment of corporate dissolution as tantamount to a
forfeiture of rights to possess local church property, see supra notes 97, 108 and
accompanying text.
In reversing, the Colorado Court of Appeals in Mote applied the neutral
principles approach and adopted a presumption that a majority of a local con-
gregation would prevail, absent a showing that the identity of the true local
church and control of the local church property "[was] to be determined by
some other means." Bishop & Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 668 P.2d 948, 952 (Ct.
App. 1983), rev'd, 716 P.2d 85 (Colo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 826 (1986).
The appeals court found no evidence of an express trust in favor of the general
church to rebut the presumption of majority rule and awarded control of the
disputed property to the secessionist majority. Id. at 953. The Colorado
Supreme Court reversed. Mote, 716 P.2d at 110.
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The Colorado Supreme Court condoned the appeals court's adop-
tion of a neutral principles approach. 116 The court noted, with ap-
proval, several decisions of the Colorado Court of Appeals which had
applied the neutral principles doctrine.' 17 The court disagreed, how-
ever, with the way the doctrine had been applied by the lower court."18
First, the court reasoned that a proper neutral principles inquiry should
ask initially whether the deeds, church documents and other relevant
evidence establish a trust in favor of the general church.' 19 If control is
deemed to be vested in the diocesan church, no inquiry into local con-
trol would be necessary. 120 Only if ownership is found to be vested in
the local church, the court asserted, would local control over the prop-
erty become an issue.12 1 Thus, the court refused to adopt a presump-
tion that control of local parish affairs be determined by a majority of
the parishioners. '
22
The Mote court also concluded that the lower court's neutral princi-
ples analysis had unduly restricted the scope of admissible evidence.'
23
The court reasoned that under Jones a civil court's evidentiary inquiry
could be as broad as possible so long as it involved no resolution of
doctrinal matters. 124 The Mote court concluded that, as part of a neutral
principles analysis, a court's inquiry might properly include "documents
116. Mote, 716 P.2d at 96. The court noted, however, that a compulsory
deference approach might be preferable, even necessary, in the rare instance
where a substantial portion of the available evidence was so tainted by religious
dogma as to be outside a civil court's permissible constitutional purview, render-
ing a fair resolution on the merits impossible. See id. at 96 n.1 I.
117. Id. at 97-99. The court discussed several decisions by the appeals
court which employed a neutral principles inquiry into local church articles of
incorporation, by-laws, deeds, canons and constitutions, and state statutes. Id.
118. Id. at 99.
119. Id. This line of reasoning by the court suggests that, as a threshold
matter, a neutral principles inquiry should decide whether ownership is vested
in the diocesan church. See id. An affirmative answer to this threshold inquiry
would end the analysis. See id. It should be noticed that the Mote court was more
willing to engage in speculative interpretation of church documents and canons
than the court in Barker. For a complete discussion of Barker, see infra notes 130-
42 and accompanying text.
120. Mote, 716 P.2d at 99.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 100. In rejecting a presumption of majority representation, the
court noted that state statutes governing non-profit organizations require a two-
thirds vote to amend articles of incorporation. Id. Thus, allowing a mere major-
ity of parishioners to effect a secession and dissolution of diocesan affiliation
would be inconsistent with the state two-thirds rule. See id.
123. Id. The court cited Justice Powell's dissent in Jones v. Wolf Id. (citing
443 U.S. 595, 610-21 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)). For a discussion ofJustice
Powell's dissent in Jones, see supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
124. Mote, 716 P.2d at 100. The court noted that clear language manifest-
ing an intent to create a beneficial interest in another is traditionally necessary
under trust law. Id. at 100-01; see I A. Scorr, THE LAw OF TRUSTS §§ 24-25
(1967). Restricting the permissible scope of the evidentiary inquiry, the court
reasoned, would frustrate this requirement. Mote, 716 P.2d at 101.
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23
Bohner: Religious Property Disputes and Intrinsically Religious Evidence:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35: p. 949
not traditionally associated with trust and property law, or provisions in
documents not solely couched in the traditional terms of trust and prop-
erty law."1 25 The court held that relevant evidence included the consti-
tutions and canons of the local and general church, even if intertwined
with religious concepts. 126 The court cautioned, however, that civil
courts must defer to a "definitive resolution" of any doctrinal issue in-
volved in interpreting such religious documents. 127
Applying its own version of the neutral principles approach, the
Colorado Supreme Court found that the local church's articles of incor-
poration and bylaws, and the relevant canons of the general church
demonstrated an intent by the local church to form a trust of the church
property in favor of the diocesan church. 12 8 The court therefore
awarded possession of the local church property to the diocese. 129
While the Mote court was comfortable making a searching inquiry
into intrinsically religious evidence, the California Supreme Court was
less willing to examine evidence with religious content in a case involv-
ing four local parishes of the Episcopal Church. ' 3 0 In Protestant Episcopal
Church v. Barker, 131 the four local congregations seceded from their dio-
cese, but retained possession of the local church property.13 2 The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal employed a neutral principles approach which
examined the deeds to church property, the articles of incorporation of
the local churches, state statutes and the rules of the diocese. 13 3 The
Barker court held that the compulsory deference approach was properly
limited to doctrinal and ecclesiastical disputes and was not applicable to
property disputes. 134 Deeming the case before it a dispute over prop-
125. Mote, 716 P.2d at 101 (citations omitted).
126. Id. This statement by the court suggests a broad neutral principles
inquiry, subject only to the court's discretion on a case-by-case basis of what is
and what is not an impermissible foray into religious doctrine or practice.
127. Id. at 102.
128. Id. at 104-08. The court also based its holding on the conduct of the
church and its members. See id. at 104. The court conceded that the evidence
revealed no explicit trust provisions in favor of the diocese. Id. The court, how-
ever, found an extensive "policy direction and property control to be exercised
by the general church." Id.
129. Id. at 108.
130. See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599, 171
Cal. Rptr. 541, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981).
131. 115 Cal. App. 3d 599, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864
(1981).
132. Id. at 604, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 543. In a consolidated trial, the trial court
sustained the claim of the diocese that title to the four local churches was held in
trust for the diocesan hierarchy. Id. The trial court reasoned that in a hierarchi-
cally organized church, centralized control over church property superceded
civil law disposition. Id. at 611, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 547. The trial court's analysis
basically amounted to a compulsory deference approach. See id. The California
Court of Appeal rejected this reasoning. See id. at 625, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
133. See id. at 621, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
134. Id. at 615, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 549. The court stated that "property dis-
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erty, not dogma, the court decided that a neutral principles approach
was appropriate.' 3 5 The court found that three of the local churches
had consistently exercised control over the local property and had incor-
porated before the diocese adopted a canon which declared that on dis-
solution of a church its property shall revert to the diocese.' 3 6 As to
these churches, the court awarded possession to the local congrega-
tions.13 7 The fourth church, however, was incorporated after the adop-
tion of the diocesan canon providing for reverter upon dissolution.'
3 8
Moreover, that church's articles of incorporation contained a special
provision declaring that on liquidation, dissolution or abandonment of
the corporation its property would inure to the benefit of the diocesan
body.' 3 9 The court held that this church's property was subject to an
express trust in favor of the diocese upon revocation of the parish char-
ter.' 40 By seceding from the general church, the court noted, the local
congregation had effectively revoked its charter, thus triggering the re-
verter in favor of the diocesan church.141 The neutral principles ration-
putes between temporal claimants must be resolved by neutral principles of
law." Id.
135. Id. A judicial determination that a given church dispute is over doc-
trine or over property is problematic. A comparison of the rationales in Tea and
in Barker illustrates that two very similar factual scenarios can result in two dras-
tically dissimilar characterizations of the underlying dispute. In Tea, the court
stated that possession of church property was a matter properly determined by
ecclesiastical authority and internal church regulation. Tea, 96 Nev. at 402-03,
610 P.2d at 184. In contrast, the Barker court deemed a dispute between a se-
ceding faction of a local church and a diocese to be purely a matter of property
law and within the proper jurisdiction of a civil court. Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d at
615, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 549. Thus, given similar facts, courts can reach drastically
different conclusions on whether a given dispute is ecclesiastical or purely legal,
whether compulsory deference or neutral principles is preferable, and who
should win under either approach. See, e.g., Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599, 171
Cal. Rptr. 541 (trial court applied compulsory deference in favor of diocese;
appeals court reversed and applied neutral principles in favor of local church);
Mote, 716 P.2d 85 (trial court applied compulsory deference approach in favor of
diocese; appeals court reversed and applied neutral principles approach in favor
of seceding parishioners; supreme court reversed and applied neutral principles
approach in favor of diocese).
136. Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 625, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 555. The court
noted that title to the disputed property, as to the three churches, was vested in
the local parishes, which had purchased the property without any diocesan finan-
cial assistance. Id. Moreover, the articles of incorporation of the three churches
did not contain language of trust or subordination in favor of the diocese. See id.
137. Id.
138. Id., 171 Cal. Rptr. at 555-56.
139. Id., 171 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
140. Id. at 625-26, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 556. The court's reasoning here is
similar to the Bennison court's finding that a seceding faction which dissolves its
corporate form thereby terminates its right to possess and control property held
by the church corporation. For a discussion of this reasoning in the Bennison
decision, see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
141. Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 625-26, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 556. The Barker
court was careful to avoid relying on canon law provisions. Instead, it construed
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ale in Barker, therefore, turned largely on interpretation of secular trust
language found in diocesan canon provisions and did not, according to
the court, require an inquiry into religious doctrine or practice.142
E. Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church
The most recent chapter in church property dispute litigation is
Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church. 143 The Bjorkman case is significant
in that the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that a neutral principles of
law approach could be applied in cases of secession by a local church
from its hierarchical organization and that the application of neutral
principles to a church property dispute was preferable to compulsory
deference to hierarchical church authority. 14 4
In 1978, St. John's Protestant Episcopal Church of Bellevue and
Dayton seceded from its hierarchical organization, the Protestant Epis-
copal Church in the United States of America. 14 5 In 1980, St. John's
conveyed all of its property to a newly-formed corporation, the Anglican
Catholic Parish of St. John the Evangelist, Inc. 14 6 The Episcopal
Church then commenced suit seeking imposition of a constructive trust
upon the church property for its use and benefit.' 4 7
The trial court applied the neutral principles of law approach en-
dorsed in Jones v. Wolf and held that St. John's was the owner of the
property. 148 The appellate court reversed, noting that the Jones Court
did not require application of the neutral principles approach, but
merely made it a permissible alternative to the compulsory deference
approach. 14 9 The court reasoned that the compulsory deference rule
for resolving disputes between local congregations and church gov-
erning bodies remained a constitutionally acceptable method for resolv-
ing such disputes and that a neutral principles analysis ran counter to
established Kentucky precedent on the issue. 150  The Kentucky
Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and reversed. 151
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Bjorkman, began its analysis by
noting that St. John's had acquired its property exclusively through its
documents relating to California's religious corporations law. Id. at 625-26, 171
Cal. Rptr. at 555-56.
142. See id.
143. 759 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1988).
144. Id. at 586.
145. Id. at 584. St. John's withdrawal was unequivocal and there was no
dissenting faction. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 586-87. The Kentucky Supreme Court stressed that the diocese
had avoided entanglement in the temporal affairs of the local church in order to
avoid possible civil liability. Id.
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own efforts, that title to the property was held by the local congregation
and that St. John's had freely purchased, encumbered and sold its prop-
erty without any involvement by the diocese. 152 The court then con-
cluded that it was free to adopt a neutral principles analysis since past
Kentucky cases applying a compulsory deference approach were factu-
ally distinguishable from the case at bar.153 Further, the court noted
that a compulsory deference approach invariably favored the diocesan
church and, therefore, a neutral principles approach was preferable.1 54
The court then turned its attention to an "Instrument of Donation,"
executed in 1907 by local church officials, which requested the Bishop to
"take" the disputed church building under his "spiritual jurisdic-
tion." 155 The instrument stated, in somewhat stilted language, that the
local congregation "relinquish[ed] all claim to any right and disposing
of the said building, or allowing of the use of it in any way inconsistent
with the terms and true meaning of this Instrument of Donation, and
with the consecration hereby requested by the Right Reverend, the
Bishop of this Diocese."' 15 6 The court found that the church and its
members never regarded the Instrument of Donation to be legally bind-
ing in a court of law.' 57 The court rejected the dissent's contention that
local church members intended to be bound by the instrument, citing
the fact that the local church had freely purchased, encumbered and
alienated the property without any diocesan involvement.' 58 The court
also held that a canon law provision adopted by the general church in
1907, purporting to prohibit transfer of church property without the
Bishop's consent, was regarded by both parties as nonbinding in the
absence of enforceable civil law restrictions.159
152. Id. at 584.
153. Id. at 585. The court noted that application of the compulsory defer-
ence approach in cases involving the secession of a local church from its hierar-
chical organization, as in Bjorkman, would inevitably result in the triumph of the
hierarchical organization. Id. at 586.
154. Id.
155. Id. The court noted that the Instrument of Donation applied only to
the church building and not to any real estate, the parish hall, the rectory or any
personal property. Id. The fact that the Instrument of Donation did not in any
way effect ownership of the land on which the church was constructed seemingly
casts doubt on its relevance to a church property dispute.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. The court also rejected the diocesan church's constructive trust
argument. Id. at 587. The court reasoned that the local congregation was the
true owner of the property and, therefore, it had not acted fraudulently in trans-
ferring title to the property. Id. Had the transfer been wrongful, the court ad-
ded, "constructive trust would have been the proper remedy." Id.
159. Id. at 586 (citing CONSTITUTIONS AND CANONS, supra note 30, tit. II,
canon 7, sec. 2). The court noted that the official commentary in the annotated
constitution of the Episcopal Church described the provision forbidding aliena-
tion of local church property without the written consent of the bishop as of
moral value only and without legal effect. The commentary states in part:
1990] 975NOTE
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The Bjorkman court went on to characterize the diocesan church's
relationship with St. John's as "exclusively ecclesiastical" and not en-
compassing the local parish's "temporal affairs."' 60 Implicit in the
court's reasoning was a recognition that while the hierarchical authority
of the Episcopal Church undoubtedly encompassed matters of religious
dogma and practice, local Episcopal congregations were self-governing
as to property matters.' 6 ' Accordingly, the Kentucky court ruled in
favor of the local congregation, St. John's. 162
III. ANALYSIS
The polity of a church consists of its organizational structure or sys-
tem of governance.16 3 The polity of the Episcopal Church, while argua-
bly hierarchical as to matters of dogma, is more properly characterized
as congregational in regard to property ownership.164 In other words,
State laws control the conveying and encumbering of real estate,
and each case which arises must be decided according to the law of the
situs of the property....
Dr. Dykman commented on [the canon restricting alienation
of church property] in 1952 with particular reference to the State
of New York. His comment was as follows:
The power of the General Convention over the disposition of
real property is questionable, governed as it is by the law of
the state in which it is situated. In a somewhat similar situa-
tion it has been held that the creation and dissolution of the
pastoral relation are governed by the law of the Church in
spite of the fact that a rector is an officer of a corporation cre-
ated by the state.
E. WHITE &J. DYKMAN, supra note 33, at 297 (citation omitted).
160. Bjorkman, 759 S.W.2d at 587.
161. Although the court did not actually state this to be so, it certainly im-
plied as much. By characterizing a hierarchical church's relationship to a local
parish as ecclesiastical but not temporal, the inference is that decisions on prop-
erty matters by church authorities are ultra vires. Several scholars have argued
that the Episcopal Church is hierarchical as to dogma but congregational as to
property. See Sirico, supra note 1, at 357-60. Support for this dichotomy derives
principally from an historical understanding of property matters within the Epis-
copal Church and its predecessor, the Anglican Church. See generally, R. AL-
BRIGHT, supra note 24. It still remains, however, for the Supreme Court to
articulate the criteria for making this distinction as well as to decide whether
churches may be properly deemed to contain a mix of both congregational and
hierarchical attributes.
162. Bjorkman, 759 S.W.2d at 587.
163. See D. STEVICK, supra note 27, at 74. "The polity of a church is that
arrangement of authority whereby power is distributed and the work of the
group is carried out." Id.
164. The notion of local parish independence regarding temporal affairs is
not new. See, e.g., Fiske v. Beatty, 206 A.D. 349, 201 N.Y.S. 441 (1923). In Fiske,
the New York Appellate Division stated:
The true doctrine of the Protestant Episcopal Church in America, in
relation to the sources of power of a priest or rector, as we understand
it, is correctly expressed as follows: "In the church, power does not
ascend from the congregation or the vestry to the rector; it descends from
28
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doctrinal matters are properly governed by hierarchical church author-
ity, while matters of a more secular nature are properly decided within
each congregation. 165
This dogma/property distinction derives from the historical under-
pinnings of the Episcopal Church in this country. 166 Control of local
parish property in the Episcopal Church has historically been in local
hands, and legal title is most often vested in the local church corpora-
tion, warranting at least a presumption of ownership by the local major-
ity following a schism. 167 In addition to these historical realities, first
amendment concerns militate against stripping a seceding congregation
of its property solely on the basis of canon law provisions, frequently
enacted after incorporation of the local parish, purporting to vest equi-
table title in the diocese. 168 Typical canon law provisions attempt to
create a trust in the local church property in favor of the diocesan
church in the event of a schism.' 69 Courts should not recognize such an
arrangement as creating an enforceable trust. At the very least, it would
be unfair to give retroactive effect to canon amendments absent some
affirmative manifestation of assent to such amendments by a local
above to the bishop and through the bishop to the subordinate
ministry."
Id. at 356-57, 201 N.Y.S. at 446-47 (citing WHITE'S CHURCH LAw 185 (1898 ed.)
(emphasis in original)).
165. The dogma/property distinction in the context of hierarchical
churches has the salutary effect of freeing civil courts from a constitutionally
perilous inquiry into church polity and discipline. Instead, courts can focus their
attention on the conduct and expectations of the parties concerning property mat-
ters in an effort to characterize the property relationship as either self-governing
or hierarchically-controlled. Deciding whether local church property is subject
to hierarchical control would turn on such factors as the intentions of the parties
as evidenced by past conduct and duly executed legal instruments, rather than
on a broad characterization of the relationship as either congregational or hier-
archical-a characterization which includes purely religious factors not necessar-
ily relevant to the legal disposition of property. See Notejudicial Intervention in
Disputes over Church Property, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1142, 1158-60 (1962).
166. For a discussion of the historically local nature of church property
ownership within the Episcopal Church in this country, see supra notes 24-28
and accompanying text.
167. For cases supporting this proposition, see supra note 28.
168. See Graves, 83 N.J. at 589, 417 A.2d at 28-29 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
169. For example, the relevant Episcopal Church canon provides:
All real and personal property held by or for the benefit of any Parish,
Mission or Congregation is held in trust for this Church and the Dio-
cese thereof in which such Parish, Mission or Congregation is located.
The existence of this trust, however, shall in no way limit the power and
authority of the Parish, Mission or Congregation otherwise existing
over such property so long as the particular Parish, Mission or Congre-
gation remains a part of, and subject to, this Church and its Constitu-
tions and Canons.
CONSTIrTUTION & CANONS, supra note 30, tit. I, canon 6, sec. 4. Some diocese
include similar provisions in their canons. See, e.g., Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d at
608, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
29
Bohner: Religious Property Disputes and Intrinsically Religious Evidence:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
church congregation. 17
In Bjorkman, the Kentucky Supreme Court considered section 2 of
canon 45 of the Episcopal Church which prohibited the encumbrance or
alienation of any church without consent of the diocese.' 7 ' Avoiding
any inquiry into the purpose and substance of canon law, the court in-
stead stressed that the parties never intended canon law provisions to be
legally binding.' 7 2 In this way, the Bjorkman court was able to correctly
recognize that section 2 of canon 45 was without legal effect.' 7 3
Further analysis supports the Bjorkman court's rejection of church
constitutions, religious documents and canon law provisions in general.
The purpose and substance underlying Episcopal canon law, for in-
stance, demonstrates its dubious legal significance. Episcopal canon law
is determined by religious dogma and theology; 174 its basis is said to be
in the Bible.1 75 Thus, Episcopal canon law provisions, church constitu-
tions and similar ecclesiastical documents, such as the "Instrument of
Donation" in Bjorkman, are poor indicia of legal intent. Any judicial de-
cision which relies on church documents, constitutions and canon law
provisions compromises its legitimacy by attaching legal significance to
expressions of religious intent. 176 In view of the intrinsically religious
nature of canon law provisions, religious documents and the like, courts
should avoid altogether any inquiry into such evidence in seeking to as-
certain the will of the parties regarding the legal disposition of
property. 177
170. See, e.g., Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541 (refusing to
apply diocesan canons to parishes incorporated before enactment of canons).
171. Bjorkman, 759 S.W.2d at 586. Canon 45 is the present-day codification
of tit. I, canon 6, sec. 3.
172. Bjorkman, 759 S.W.2d at 586. The Bjorkman court's refusal to examine
the underlying historical significance of religious constitutions, documents and
canons is striking, but not surprising. Civil courts are bound to avoid adjudicat-
ing doctrinal matters. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976). Courts are therefore anxious to avoid a searching exami-
nation of the doctrinal underpinnings of religious evidence in order to avoid
even the slightest hint of an impermissible doctrinal inquiry and possible appel-
late reversal. By focusing instead on the expectations of the parties, the
Bjorkman court ostensibly avoided addressing the intrinsically religious nature of
the evidence it was reviewing by concluding that the parties never intended reli-
gious documents, constitutions and canons to be legally binding. The court's
conclusion that canon 45 was not an expression of binding legal intent, there-
fore, casts doubt on the propriety of considering such evidence in the first place.
See Bjorkman, 759 S.W.2d at 586.
173. Bjorkman, 759 S.W.2d at 586.
174. See D. STEVICK, supra note 27, at 17 ("[Tlhe distinctive role of canon
law is as the servant of theology.").
175. See id. at 33.
176. A more difficult question might arise where one party regarded a reli-
gious document as legally binding while the other party did not. Such a case
might require a more in-depth examination of the validity of religious evidence
than that undertaken by the Bjorkman court.
177. Judicial review of intrinsically religious evidence is necessarily prob-
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It has been suggested that as an approach to resolving church prop-
erty disputes neutral principles must be abandoned.' 7 8 This suggestion
finds support in the tendency of courts applying the neutral principles
approach to misinterpret the realities of church governance due to the
restrictive scope of evidence the approach permits. 179 Moreover, there
is a danger that courts will stray into forbidden zones of religious doc-
trine and practice in applying property and trust principles to essentially
ecclesiastical evidence. 180 Thus, the neutral principles approach is not
particularly effective in avoiding doctrinal incursions or in ascertaining
the prior intent of the parties.
A better solution would be to apply the neutral principles approach
narrowly, that is, allow civil courts to review only purely secular docu-
ments in applying the neutral principles approach.18 ' A narrow neutral
principles inquiry would accomplish two goals. First, courts would
avoid any incursion into forbidden doctrinal matters by mechanically
and consistently excluding any religious evidence from review.18 2 Such
an approach in Bjorkman would have precluded review of the "Instru-
ment of Donation" and canonical provisions relied upon by the dio-
cese.183 Instead of reviewing essentially religious evidence, which was
lematic. Neutral principles purports to review only secular provisions in reli-
gious documents. Singling out secular language in documents containing a
hybrid of secular and religious language ignores the essentially religious context
and thrust of the excised material. For instance, determining legally binding
intent based on secular language contained in the Instrument of Donation in
Bjorkman would provide only an incomplete picture of the document as a whole.
Traditional rules of interpretation in trust and property law, as well as common
sense, require that legal documents be read in their entirety, in light of sur-
rounding factors, in order to discover the intent expressed therein. Thus, evi-
dence containing a mixture of secular and religious provisions and concepts
should be excluded from civil court review for several reasons: 1) isolated secu-
lar provisions, deprived of their context, do not adequately reflect the expecta-
tions of the parties, 2) it is not clear that the religious organization and its
members agreed that these documents would be controlling in the event of a
property dispute, and 3) civil courts are incompetent to decide which provisions
are secular and which are imbued with religious meaning. Sirico, supra note 1, at
356.
178. See, Harris, Neutral Principles of The Law and Church Property in the United
States, 30J. CHURCH & ST. 515, 530 (1988).
179. See Jones, 443 U.S. 595, 610-11 (Powell, J., dissenting). For a discus-
sion ofJustice Powell's dissent in Jones and his assertion that the neutral princi-
ples approach acts as a restrictive rule of evidence, see supra notes 62-64 and
accompanying text.
180. See Sirico, supra note 1, at 356-57.
181. See id. at 357-58.
182. See id.
183. The Bjorkman court refused to give legal effect to the Instrument of
Donation on the grounds that both parties regarded it as nonbinding in the ab-
sence of enforceable civil law restrictions. Bjorkman, 759 S.W.2d at 586. The
Bjorkman court's treatment of religious evidence implicitly supports a narrow
neutral principles approach. For a discussion of this aspect of Bjorkman, see
supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
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ultimately cast aside as untrustworthy, the court in Bjorkman might have
focused exclusively on secular documents, such as articles of incorpora-
tion, trust instruments and state statutes governing church property
ownership, to ascertain the will of the parties.'8 4
The Bjorkman court's rejection of religious evidence implicitly sup-
ports this narrow neutral principles approach. The court basically dis-
missed the canon law provisions and the "Instrument of Donation" on
the grounds that neither party ever regarded them as legally binding.'1 5
A recognition that parties to a religious dispute do not regard religious
documents as dispositive of property matters underscores the problem
with relying on such evidence in the first place. Courts should not pre-
tend to extract the intent of the parties from documents the parties
themselves do not regard as legally binding.' 8 6 Moreover, the expres-
sions of religious intent codified in canon law provisions and religious
instruments of donation do not necessarily coincide with the legal intent
of a church and its members regarding the disposition of church prop-
erty.'8 7 Therefore, courts should avoid religious evidence entirely and
rely solely on formal expressions of legal intent in the form of duly exe-
cuted deeds, articles of incorporation and trust instruments.'18
More importantly, adoption of such an approach would encourage
religious groups to order their affairs by executing legal documents ex-
pressing their intent as to the disposition of local church property in
advance of a schism. 18 9 In this way, a narrow neutral principles ap-
proach would allow local churches and diocese to anticipate and plan for
the future with greater certainty since judicial construction of legal doc-
uments would be more uniform and predictable than judicial construc-
tion of religious documents. 190
184. The Bjorkman court's ratio decidendi rested solely on its interpretation of
secular evidence such as property deeds and articles of incorporation. Bjorkman,
759 S.W.2d at 587.
185. Id. at 586.
186. Id.
187. See E. WHITE &J. DYKMAN, supra note 33, at 297.
188. See Sirico, supra note 1, at 357-59.
189. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04. Arguably, forcing church organizations
to articulate their intentions in the event of a schism involving church property
could in itself precipitate a dispute where none would have otherwise arisen.
190. That court decisions based on legal documents are more uniform and
predictable than those based on religious documents is evidenced by the wide
variety of results reached under the rubric of neutral principles. Moreover, the
fact that the evidentiary scope of a neutral principles inquiry has been so loosely
defined by the Supreme Court injects a significant element of uncertainty into
the task of predicting an outcome based on any given set of facts. Excluding
religious evidence would eliminate this element of unpredictability and allow
religious groups to order their affairs based on the existing body of trust and
property precedents.
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IV. CONCLUSION
State court decisions since Jones v. Wolf reflect a growing trend in
favor of a narrow application of the neutral principles approach.' 9 ' The
Bjorkman decision is the latest step in this trend and signals a growing
realization by state courts of the constitutional perils associated with an
overly broad neutral principles analysis.' 9 2 A narrow neutral principles
approach properly places intrinsically religious evidence, such as church
canons, constitutions and donation instruments, outside the purview of
the court's inquiry. 19 3 The result is an overly formalistic approach, but
one that is uniform, predictable and simple in application. 19 4 The
Bjorkman majority correctly recognized the dubious wisdom of relying
on canon law provisions and ecclesiastical documents in deciding church
property disputes.19 5 Moreover, the Bjorkman court properly character-
ized the Episcopal Church as hierarchical as to dogma but congrega-
tional, or self-governing, as to property ownership. 19 6 Such a
dichotomy derives from the historically local nature of church property
ownership within the Episcopal Church in this country.19 7 By recogniz-
ing that the authority of the Episcopal Church hierarchy does not neces-
sarily govern disputes over local parish property, the Bjorkman decision
realistically considered the historical realities of local church ownership
within the Episcopal Church. Moreover, the Bjorkman decision confirms
that compulsory deference to hierarchical church authority should give
way to a narrow neutral principles of law approach in disputes over
property within the Episcopal Church.
Robert J. Bohner, Jr.
191. For a discussion of this trend, see supra notes 71-162 and accompany-
ing text.
192. For a discussion of the problems with a broad application of the neu-
tral principles approach, see supra notes 174-88 and accompanying text.
193. For a discussion of the relative merits of a narrow neutral principles
approach, see supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion of the ramifications of a narrow neutral principles ap-
proach, see Sirico, supra note 1, at 357-59.
195. For a discussion of the Bjorkman court's rejection of intrinsically reli-
gious evidence, see supra notes 143-62, 195-97 and accompanying text.
196. For a discussion of the Bjorkman court's characterization of the Episco-
pal Church as congregational, or locally self-governing, as to parish property
matters, see supra notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
197. For a discussion of the history of local church ownership in the Episco-
pal Church, see supra notes 24-35, 166 and accompanying text.
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